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Abstract
Adversarial examples — perturbations to the
input of a model that elicit large changes in the
output — have been shown to be an effective
way of assessing the robustness of sequence-
to-sequence (seq2seq) models. However, these
perturbations only indicate weaknesses in the
model if they do not change the input so sig-
nificantly that it legitimately results in changes
in the expected output. This fact has largely
been ignored in the evaluations of the growing
body of related literature. Using the example
of untargeted attacks on machine translation
(MT), we propose a new evaluation framework
for adversarial attacks on seq2seq models that
takes the semantic equivalence of the pre- and
post-perturbation input into account. Using
this framework, we demonstrate that existing
methods may not preserve meaning in general,
breaking the aforementioned assumption that
source side perturbations should not result in
changes in the expected output. We further use
this framework to demonstrate that adding ad-
ditional constraints on attacks allows for ad-
versarial perturbations that are more meaning-
preserving, but nonetheless largely change the
output sequence. Finally, we show that per-
forming untargeted adversarial training with
meaning-preserving attacks is beneficial to the
model in terms of adversarial robustness, with-
out hurting test performance. 1
1 Introduction
Attacking a machine learning model with ad-
versarial perturbations is the process of making
changes to its input to maximize an adversarial
goal, such as mis-classification (Szegedy et al.,
2013) or mis-translation (Zhao et al., 2018). These
attacks provide insight into the vulnerabilities of
machine learning models and their brittleness to
1A toolkit implementing our evaluation framework is
released at https://github.com/pmichel31415/
teapot-nlp.
samples outside the training distribution. Lack of
robustness to these attacks poses security concerns
to safety-critical applications, e.g. self-driving
cars (Bojarski et al., 2016).
Adversarial attacks were first defined and in-
vestigated for computer vision systems (Szegedy
et al. (2013); Goodfellow et al. (2014); Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. (2016) inter alia), where the input
space is continuous, making minuscule perturba-
tions largely imperceptible to the human eye. In
discrete spaces such as natural language sentences,
the situation is more problematic; even a flip of a
single word or character is generally perceptible
by a human reader. Thus, most of the mathemati-
cal framework in previous work is not directly ap-
plicable to discrete text data. Moreover, there is
no canonical distance metric for textual data like
the `p norm in real-valued vector spaces such as
images, and evaluating the level of semantic simi-
larity between two sentences is a field of research
of its own (Cer et al., 2017). This elicits a natural
question: what does the term “adversarial pertur-
bation” mean in the context of natural language
processing (NLP)?
We propose a simple but natural criterion for
adversarial examples in NLP, particularly untar-
geted2 attacks on seq2seq models: adversarial
examples should be meaning-preserving on the
source side, but meaning-destroying on the target
side. The focus on explicitly evaluating mean-
ing preservation is in contrast to previous work
on adversarial examples for seq2seq models (Be-
linkov and Bisk, 2018; Zhao et al., 2018; Cheng
et al., 2018; Ebrahimi et al., 2018a). Nonethe-
less, this feature is extremely important; given two
sentences with equivalent meaning, we would ex-
pect a good model to produce two outputs with
2Here we use the term untargeted in the same sense as
(Ebrahimi et al., 2018a): an attack whose goal is simply to
decrease performance with respect to a reference translation.
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equivalent meaning. In other words, any meaning-
preserving perturbation that results in the model
output changing drastically highlights a fault of
the model.
A first technical contribution of this paper is
to lay out a method for formalizing this concept
of meaning-preserving perturbations (§2). This
makes it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of
adversarial attacks or defenses either using gold-
standard human evaluation, or approximations that
can be calculated without human intervention.
We further propose a simple method of imbu-
ing gradient-based word substitution attacks (§3.1)
with simple constraints aimed at increasing the
chance that the meaning is preserved (§3.2).
Our experiments are designed to answer several
questions about meaning preservation in seq2seq
models. First, we evaluate our proposed “source-
meaning-preserving, target-meaning-destroying”
criterion for adversarial examples using both man-
ual and automatic evaluation (§4.2) and find that a
less widely used evaluation metric (chrF) provides
significantly better correlation with human judg-
ments than the more widely used BLEU and ME-
TEOR metrics. We proceed to perform an evalua-
tion of adversarial example generation techniques,
finding that chrF does help to distinguish between
perturbations that are more meaning-preserving
across a variety of languages and models (§4.3).
Finally, we apply existing methods for adversar-
ial training to the adversarial examples with these
constraints and show that making adversarial in-
puts more semantically similar to the source is
beneficial for robustness to adversarial attacks and
does not decrease test performance on the original
data distribution (§5).
2 A Framework for Evaluating
Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we present a simple procedure for
evaluating adversarial attacks on seq2seq models.
We will use the following notation: x and y refer
to the source and target sentence respectively. We
denote x’s translation by modelM as yM . Finally,
xˆ and yˆM represent an adversarially perturbed ver-
sion of x and its translation by M , respectively.
The nature of M and the procedure for obtaining
xˆ from x are irrelevant to the discussion below.
2.1 The Adversarial Trade-off
The goal of adversarial perturbations is to pro-
duce failure cases for the model M . Hence, the
evaluation must include some measure of the tar-
get similarity between y and yM , which we will
denote stgt(y, yˆM ). However, if no distinction is
being made between perturbations that preserve
the meaning and those that don’t, a sentence like
“he’s very friendly” is considered a valid adversar-
ial perturbation of “he’s very adversarial”, even
though its meaning is the opposite. Hence, it
is crucial, when evaluating adversarial attacks on
MT models, that the discrepancy between the orig-
inal and adversarial input sentence be quantified in
a way that is sensitive to meaning. Let us denote
such a source similarity score ssrc(x, xˆ).
Based on these functions, we define the target
relative score decrease as:
dtgt(y, yM , yˆM ) =
{
0 if stgt(y, yˆM ) ≥ stgt(y, yM )
stgt(y,yM )−stgt(y,yˆM )
stgt(y,yM )
otherwise
(1)
The choice to report the relative decrease in stgt
makes scores comparable across different models
or languages3. For instance, for languages that
are comparatively easy to translate (e.g. French-
English), stgt will be higher in general, and so will
the gap between stgt(y, yM ) and stgt(y, yˆM ). How-
ever this does not necessarily mean that attacks on
this language pair are more effective than attacks
on a “difficult” language pair (e.g. Czech-English)
where stgt is usually smaller.
We recommend that both ssrc and dtgt be re-
ported when presenting adversarial attack results.
However, in some cases where a single number
is needed, we suggest reporting the attack’s suc-
cess S := ssrc +dtgt. The interpretation is simple:
S > 1⇔ dtgt > 1− ssrc, which means that the at-
tack has destroyed the target meaning (dtgt) more
than it has destroyed the source meaning (1−ssrc).
Importantly, this framework can be extended
beyond strictly meaning-preserving attacks. For
example, for targeted keyword introduction at-
tacks (Cheng et al., 2018; Ebrahimi et al., 2018a),
the same evaluation framework can be used if stgt
(resp. ssrc) is modified to account for the presence
(resp. absence) of the keyword (or its translation in
the source). Similarly this can be extended to other
3Note that we do not allow negative dtgt to keep all scores
between 0 and 1.
tasks by adapting stgt (e.g. for classification one
would use the zero-one loss, and adapt the success
threshold).
2.2 Similarity Metrics
Throughout §2.1, we have not given an exact de-
scription of the semantic similarity scores ssrc and
stgt. Indeed, automatically evaluating the semantic
similarity between two sentences is an open area
of research and it makes sense to decouple the def-
inition of adversarial examples from the specific
method used to measure this similarity. In this sec-
tion, we will discuss manual and automatic met-
rics that may be used to calculate it.
2.2.1 Human Judgment
Judgment by speakers of the language of interest
is the de facto gold standard metric for semantic
similarity. Specific criteria such as adequacy/flu-
ency (Ma and Cieri, 2006), acceptability (Goto
et al., 2013), and 6-level semantic similarity (Cer
et al., 2017) have been used in evaluations of MT
and sentence embedding methods. In the context
of adversarial attacks, we propose the following
6-level evaluation scheme, which is motivated by
previous measures, but designed to be (1) symmet-
ric, like Cer et al. (2017), (2) and largely considers
meaning preservation but at the very low and high
levels considers fluency of the output4, like Goto
et al. (2013):
How would you rate the similarity between
the meaning of these two sentences?
0. The meaning is completely different or
one of the sentences is meaningless
1. The topic is the same but the meaning is
different
2. Some key information is different
3. The key information is the same but the
details differ
4. Meaning is essentially equal but some
expressions are unnatural
5. Meaning is essentially equal and the two
sentences are well-formed Englisha
aOr the language of interest.
4This is important to rule out nonsensical sentences and
distinguish between clean and “noisy” paraphrases (e.g. ty-
pos, non-native speech. . . ). We did not give annotators addi-
tional instruction specific to typos.
2.2.2 Automatic Metrics
Unfortunately, human evaluation is expensive,
slow and sometimes difficult to obtain, for exam-
ple in the case of low-resource languages. This
makes automatic metrics that do not require hu-
man intervention appealing for experimental re-
search. This section describes 3 evaluation metrics
commonly used as alternatives to human evalua-
tion, in particular to evaluate translation models.5
BLEU: (Papineni et al., 2002) is an automatic
metric based on n-gram precision coupled with
a penalty for shorter sentences. It relies on ex-
act word-level matches and therefore cannot detect
synonyms or morphological variations.
METEOR: (Denkowski and Lavie, 2014) first
estimates alignment between the two sentences
and then computes unigram F-score (biased to-
wards recall) weighted by a penalty for longer sen-
tences. Importantly, METEOR uses stemming,
synonymy and paraphrasing information to per-
form alignments. On the downside, it requires lan-
guage specific resources.
chrF: (Popovic´, 2015) is based on the char-
acter n-gram F-score. In particular we will use
the chrF2 score (based on the F2-score — recall
is given more importance), following the recom-
mendations from Popovic´ (2016). By operating
on a sub-word level, it can reflect the semantic
similarity between different morphological inflec-
tions of one word (for instance), without requir-
ing language-specific knowledge which makes it a
good one-size-fits-all alternative.
Because multiple possible alternatives exist, it
is important to know which is the best stand-in for
human evaluation. To elucidate this, we will com-
pare these metrics to human judgment in terms of
Pearson correlation coefficient on outputs result-
ing from a variety of attacks in §4.2.
3 Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we overview the adversarial attacks
we will be considering in the rest of this paper.
3.1 Attack Paradigm
We perform gradient-based attacks that replace
one word in the sentence so as to maximize an ad-
versarial loss functionLadv, similar to the substitu-
tion attacks proposed in (Ebrahimi et al., 2018b).
5Note that other metrics of similarity are certainly appli-
cable within the overall framework of §2.2.1, but we limit our
examination in this paper to the three noted here.
Original Pourquoi faire cela ?
English gloss Why do this?
Unconstrained construisant (English: building) faire cela ?
kNN interrogez (English: interrogate) faire cela ?
CharSwap Puorquoi (typo) faire cela ?
Original Si seulement je pouvais me muscler aussi rapidement.
English gloss If only I could build my muscle this fast.
Unconstrained Si seulement je pouvais me muscler etc rapidement.
kNN Si seulement je pouvais me muscler plsu (typo for “more”) rapidement.
CharSwap Si seulement je pouvais me muscler asusi (typo) rapidement.
Table 1: Examples of different adversarial inputs. The substituted word is highlighted.
3.1.1 General Approach
Precisely, for a word-based translation model M6,
and given an input sentence w1, . . . , wn, we find
the position i∗ and word w∗ satisfying the follow-
ing optimization problem:
argmax
1≤i≤n,wˆ∈V
Ladv(w0, . . . , wi−1, wˆ, wi+1, . . . , wn)
(2)
where Ladv is a differentiable function which rep-
resents our adversarial objective. Using the first
order approximation of Ladv around the original
word vectors w1, . . . ,wn7, this can be derived to
be equivalent to optimizing
argmax
1≤i≤n,wˆ∈V
[wˆ −wi]ᵀ∇wi Ladv (3)
The above optimization problem can be solved
by brute-force in O(n|V|) space complexity,
whereas the time complexity is bottlenecked by a
|V|×d times n×dmatrix multiplication, which is
not more computationally expensive than comput-
ing logits during the forward pass of the model.
Overall, this naive approach is sufficiently fast
to be conducive to adversarial training. We also
found that the attacks benefited from normalizing
the gradient by taking its sign.
Extending this approach to finding the optimal
perturbations for more than 1 substitution would
require exhaustively searching over all possible
combinations. However, previous work (Ebrahimi
6Note that this formulation is also valid for character-
based models (see Ebrahimi et al. (2018a)) and subword-
based models. For subword-based models, additional diffi-
culty would be introduced due to changes to the input result-
ing in different subword segmentations. This poses an inter-
esting challenge that is beyond the scope of the current work.
7More generally we will use the bold w when talking
about the embedding vector of word w
et al., 2018a) suggests that greedy search is a good
enough approximation.
3.1.2 The Adversarial Loss Ladv
We want to find an adversarial input xˆ such that,
assuming that the model has produced the correct
output y1, . . . , yt−1 up to step t− 1 during decod-
ing, the probability that the model makes an error
at the next step t is maximized.
In the log-semiring, this translates into the fol-
lowing loss function:
Ladv(xˆ, y) =
|y|∑
t=1
log(1− p(yt | xˆ, y1, . . . , yt−1))
(4)
3.2 Enforcing Semantically Similar
Adversarial Inputs
In contrast to previous methods, which don’t con-
sider meaning preservation, we propose simple
modifications of the approach presented in §3.1 to
create adversarial perturbations at the word level
that are more likely to preserve meaning. The ba-
sic idea is to restrict the possible word substitu-
tions to similar words. We compare two sets of
constraints:
kNN: This constraint enforces that the word be
replaced only with one of its 10 nearest neighbors
in the source embedding space. This has two ef-
fects: first, the replacement will be likely semanti-
cally related to the original word (if words close
in the embedding space are indeed semantically
related, as hinted by Table 1). Second, it ensures
that the replacement’s word vector is close enough
to the original word vector that the first order as-
sumption is more likely to be satisfied.
CharSwap: This constraint requires that the
substituted words must be obtained by swapping
characters. Word internal character swaps have
been shown to not affect human readers greatly
(McCusker et al., 1981), hence making them likely
to be meaning-preserving. Moreover we add the
additional constraint that the substitution must not
be in the vocabulary, which will likely be partic-
ularly meaning-destroying on the target side for
the word-based models we test here. In such cases
where word-internal character swaps are not pos-
sible or can’t produce out-of-vocabulary (OOV)
words, we resort to the naive strategy of repeat-
ing the last character of the word. The exact pro-
cedure used to produce this kind of perturbations
is described in Appendix A.1. Note that for a
word-based model, every OOV will look the same
(a special <unk> token), however the choice of
OOV will still have an influence on the output of
the model because we use unk-replacement.
In contrast, we refer the base attack without
constraints as Unconstrained hereforth. Table 1
gives qualitative examples of the kind of perturba-
tions generated under the different constraints.
For subword-based models, we apply the same
procedures at the subword-level on the origi-
nal segmentation. We then de-segment and re-
segment the resulting sentence (because changes
at the subword or character levels are likely to
change the segmentation of the resulting sen-
tence).
4 Experiments
Our experiments serve two purposes. First, we ex-
amine our proposed framework of evaluating ad-
versarial attacks (§2), and also elucidate which au-
tomatic metrics correlate better with human judg-
ment for the purpose of evaluating adversarial
attacks (§4.2). Second, we use this evaluation
framework to compare various adversarial attacks
and demonstrate that adversarial attacks that are
explicitly constrained to preserve meaning receive
better assessment scores (§4.3).
4.1 Experimental setting
Data: Following previous work on adver-
sarial examples for seq2seq models (Be-
linkov and Bisk, 2018; Ebrahimi et al.,
2018a), we perform all experiments on the
IWSLT2016 dataset (Cettolo et al., 2016) in the
{French,German,Czech}→English directions
(fr-en, de-en and cs-en). We compile
all previous IWSLT test sets before 2015 as
validation data, and keep the 2015 and 2016 test
sets as test data. The data is tokenized with the
Moses tokenizer (Koehn et al., 2007). The exact
data statistics can be found in Appendix A.2.
MT Models: We perform experiments with
two common neural machine translation (NMT)
models. The first is an LSTM based encoder-
decoder architecture with attention (Luong et al.,
2015). It uses 2-layer encoders and decoders, and
dot-product attention. We set the word embedding
dimension to 300 and all others to 500. The
second model is a self-attentional Transformer
(Vaswani et al., 2017), with 6 1024-dimensional
encoder and decoder layers and 512 dimensional
word embeddings. Both the models are trained
with Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2014), dropout
(Srivastava et al., 2014) of probability 0.3 and
label smoothing (Szegedy et al., 2016) with value
0.1. We experiment with both word based models
(vocabulary size fixed at 40k) and subword
based models (BPE (Sennrich et al., 2016) with
30k operations). For word-based models, we
perform <unk> replacement, replacing <unk>
tokens in the translated sentences with the source
words with the highest attention value during
inference. The full experimental setup and source
code are available at https://github.
com/pmichel31415/translate/tree/
paul/pytorch_translate/research/
adversarial/experiments.
Automatic Metric Implementations: To eval-
uate both sentence and corpus level BLEU
score, we first de-tokenize the output and use
sacreBLEU8 (Post, 2018) with its internal intl
tokenization, to keep BLEU scores agnostic to to-
kenization. We compute METEOR using the of-
ficial implementation9. ChrF is reported with the
sacreBLEU implementation on detokenized text
with default parameters. A toolkit implementing
the evaluation framework described in §2.1 for
these metrics is released at https://github.
com/pmichel31415/teapot-nlp.
4.2 Correlation of Automatic Metrics with
Human Judgment
We first examine which of the automatic metrics
listed in §2.2 correlates most with human judg-
ment for our adversarial attacks. For this exper-
iment, we restrict the scope to the case of the
8https://github.com/mjpost/sacreBLEU
9http://www.cs.cmu.edu/˜alavie/METEOR/
LSTM Transformer
Language pair cs-en de-en fr-en cs-en de-en fr-en
Word-based
Target RDChrF Target RDChrF
Original chrF 45.68 49.43 57.49 47.66 51.08 58.04
Unconstrained 25.38 25.54 25.59 25.24 25.00 24.68
CharSwap 24.11 24.94 23.60 21.59 23.23 21.75
kNN 15.00 15.59 15.22 20.74 19.97 18.59
Source chrF Source chrF
Unconstrained 70.14 72.39 74.29 69.03 71.93 73.23
CharSwap 82.65 84.40 86.62 84.13 85.97 87.02
kNN 78.08 78.11 77.62 74.94 77.92 77.88
Subword-based
Target RDChrF Target RDChrF
Original chrF 48.30 52.42 59.08 49.70 54.01 59.65
Unconstrained 25.79 26.03 26.96 23.97 25.07 25.28
CharSwap 18.65 19.15 19.75 16.98 18.38 17.85
kNN 15.00 16.26 17.12 19.02 18.58 18.63
Source chrF Source chrF
Unconstrained 69.32 72.12 73.57 68.66 71.51 72.65
CharSwap 85.84 87.46 87.98 85.79 87.07 87.99
kNN 76.17 77.74 78.03 73.05 75.91 76.54
Table 2: Target RDchrF and source chrF scores for all the attacks on all our models (word- and subword-based
LSTM and Transformer).
LSTM model on fr-en. For the French side, we
randomly select 900 sentence pairs (x, xˆ) from the
validation set, 300 for each of the Unconstrained,
kNN and CharSwap constraints. To vary the level
of perturbation, the 300 pairs contain an equal
amount of perturbed input obtained by substituting
1, 2 and 3 words. On the English side, we select
900 pairs of reference translations and translations
of adversarial input (y, yˆM ) with the same distri-
bution of attacks as the source side, as well as 300
(y, yM ) pairs (to include translations from origi-
nal inputs). This amounts to 1,200 sentence pairs
in the target side.
These sentences are sent to English and French
speaking annotators to be rated according to the
guidelines described in §2.2.1. Each sample (a
pair of sentences) is rated by two independent
evaluators. If the two ratings differ, the sample is
sent to a third rater (an auditor and subject matter
expert) who makes the final decision.
Finally, we compare the human results to each
automatic metric with Pearson’s correlation coeffi-
cient. The correlations are reported in Table 3. As
evidenced by the results, chrF exhibits higher cor-
relation with human judgment, followed by ME-
TEOR and BLEU. This is true both on the source
side (x vs xˆ) and in the target side (y vs yˆM ). We
Language BLEU METEOR chrF
French 0.415 0.440 0.586∗
English 0.357 0.478∗ 0.497
Table 3: Correlation of automatic metrics to human
judgment of adversarial source and target sentences.
“∗” indicates that the correlation is significantly better
than the next-best one.
evaluate the statistical significance of this result
using a paired bootstrap test for p < 0.01. No-
tably we find that chrF is significantly better than
METEOR in French but not in English. This is
not too unexpected because METEOR has access
to more language-dependent resources in English
(specifically synonym information) and thereby
can make more informed matches of these syn-
onymous words and phrases. Moreover the French
source side contains more “character-level” errors
(from CharSwap attacks) which are not picked-up
well by word-based metrics like BLEU and ME-
TEOR. For a breakdown of the correlation coef-
ficients according to number of perturbation and
type of constraints, we refer to Appendix A.3.
Thus, in the following, we report attack results
both in terms of chrF in the source (ssrc) and rela-
tive decrease in chrF (RDchrF) in the target (dtgt).
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the results in Table 2 for word-based models. High source chrF and target
RDchrF (upper-right corner) indicates a good attack.
4.3 Attack Results
We can now compare attacks under the three con-
straints Unconstrained, kNN and CharSwap and
draw conclusions on their capacity to preserve
meaning in the source and destroy it in the tar-
get. Attacks are conducted on the validation set
using the approach described in §3.1 with 3 sub-
stitutions (this means that each adversarial input is
at edit distance at most 3 from the original input).
Results (on a scale of 0 to 100 for readability) are
reported in Table 2 for both word- and subword-
based LSTM and Transformer models. To give a
better idea of how the different variables (language
pair, model, attack) affect performance, we give a
graphical representation of these same results in
Figure 1 for the word-based models. The rest of
this section discusses the implication of these re-
sults.
Source chrF Highlights the Effect of Adding
Constraints: Comparing the kNN and CharSwap
rows to Unconstrained in the “source” sections of
Table 2 clearly shows that constrained attacks have
a positive effect on meaning preservation. Beyond
validating our assumptions from §3.2, this shows
that source chrF is useful to carry out the compar-
ison in the first place10. To give a point of refer-
ence, results from the manual evaluation carried
out in §4.2 show that that 90% of the French sen-
tence pairs to which humans gave a score of 4 or 5
in semantic similarity have a chrF > 78.
10It can be argued that using chrF gives an advantage to
CharSwap over kNN for source preservation (as opposed to
METEOR for example). We find that this is the case for
Czech and German (source METEOR is higher for kNN) but
not French. Moreover we find (see A.3) that chrF correlates
better with human judgement even for kNN.
Successful attack
(source chrF = 80.89, target RDchrF = 84.06)
Original Ils le re´investissent directement en engageant
plus de proce`s.
Adv. src Ilss le re´investissent dierctement en engagaent
plus de proce`s.
Ref. They plow it right back into filing more troll
lawsuits.
Base output They direct it directly by engaging more cases.
Adv. output .. de plus.
Unsuccessful attack
(source chrF = 54.46, target RDchrF = 0.00)
Original C’e´tait en Juillet 1969.
Adv. src C’e´tiat en Jiullet 1969.
Ref. This is from July, 1969.
Base output This was in July 1969.
Adv. output This is. in 1969.
Table 4: Example of CharSwap attacks on the fr-en
LSTM. The first example is a successful attack (high
source chrF and target RDchrF) whereas the second is
not.
Different Architectures are not Equal in the
Face of Adversity: Inspection of the target-
side results yields several interesting observations.
First, the high RDchrF of CharSwap for word-
based model is yet another indication of their
known shortcomings when presented with words
out of their training vocabulary, even with <unk>-
replacement. Second, and perhaps more interest-
ingly, Transformer models appear to be less robust
to small embedding perturbations (kNN attacks)
compared to LSTMs. Although the exploration of
the exact reasons for this phenomenon is beyond
the scope of this work, this is a good example that
RDchrF can shed light on the different behavior of
different architectures when confronted with ad-
versarial input. Overall, we find that the Char-
Swap constraint is the only one that consistently
produces attacks with > 1 average success (as de-
fined in Section 2.1) according to Table 2. Table 4
contains two qualitative examples of this attack on
the LSTM model in fr-en.
5 Adversarial Training with
Meaning-Preserving Attacks
5.1 Adversarial Training
Adversarial training (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
augments the training data with adversarial exam-
ples. Formally, in place of the negative log likeli-
hood (NLL) objective on a sample x, y, L(x, y) =
NLL(x, y), the loss function is replaced with an
interpolation of the NLL of the original sample
x, y and an adversarial sample xˆ, y:
L′(x, y) = (1− α)NLL(x, y) + αNLL(xˆ, y)
(5)
Ebrahimi et al. (2018a) suggest that while ad-
versarial training improves robustness to adversar-
ial attacks, it can be detrimental to test perfor-
mance on non-adversarial input. We investigate
whether this is still the case when adversarial at-
tacks are largely meaning-preserving.
In our experiments, we generate xˆ by applying
3 perturbations on the fly at each training step.
To maintain training speed we do not solve Equa-
tion (2) iteratively but in one shot by replacing
the argmax by top-3. Although this is less exact
than iterating, this makes adversarial training time
less than 2× slower than normal training. We per-
form adversarial training with perturbations with-
out constraints (Unconstrained-adv) and with the
CharSwap constraint (CharSwap-adv). All exper-
iments are conducted with the word-based LSTM
model.
5.2 Results
Test performance on non-adversarial input is re-
ported in Table 5. In keeping with the rest of the
paper, we primarily report chrF results, but also
show the standard BLEU as well.
We observe that when α = 1.0, i.e. the model
only sees the perturbed input during training11,
the Unconstrained-adv model suffers a drop in
test performance, whereas CharSwap-adv’s per-
formance is on par with the original. This is likely
11This setting is reminiscent of word dropout (Iyyer et al.,
2015).
Language pair cs-en de-en fr-en
Base
44.21 49.30 55.67
(22.89) (28.61) (35.28)
α = 1.0
Unconstrained-adv
41.38 46.15 53.39
(21.51) (27.06) (33.96)
CharSwap-adv
43.74 48.85 55.60
(23.00) (28.45) (35.33)
α = 0.5
Unconstrained-adv
43.68 48.60 55.55
(22.93) (28.30) (35.25)
CharSwap-adv
44.57 49.14 55.88
(23.66) (28.66) (35.63)
Table 5: chrF (BLEU) scores on the original test set be-
fore/after adversarial training of the word-based LSTM
model.
Language pair cs-en de-en fr-en
Base 24.11 24.94 23.60
α = 1.0
Unconstrained-adv 25.99 26.24 25.67
CharSwap-adv 16.46 17.19 15.72
α = 0.5
Unconstrained-adv 26.52 27.26 24.92
CharSwap-adv 20.41 20.24 16.08
Table 6: Robustness to CharSwap attacks on the val-
idation set with/without adversarial training (RDchrF).
Lower is better.
attributable to the spurious training samples (xˆ, y)
where y is not an acceptable translation of xˆ intro-
duced by the lack of constraint. This effect disap-
pears when α = 0.5 because the model sees the
original samples as well.
Not unexpectedly, Table 6 indicates that
CharSwap-adv is more robust to CharSwap con-
strained attacks for both values of α, with 1.0
giving the best results. On the other hand,
Unconstrained-adv is similarly or more vulnera-
ble to these attacks than the baseline. Hence, we
can safely conclude that adversarial training with
CharSwap attacks improves robustness while not
impacting test performance as much as uncon-
strained attacks.
6 Related work
Following seminal work on adversarial attacks by
Szegedy et al. (2013), Goodfellow et al. (2014)
introduced gradient-based attacks and adversarial
training. Since then, a variety of attack (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016) and defense (Cisse´ et al.,
2017; Kolter and Wong, 2017) mechanisms have
been proposed. Adversarial examples for NLP
specifically have seen attacks on sentiment (Pa-
pernot et al., 2016; Samanta and Mehta, 2017;
Ebrahimi et al., 2018b), malware (Grosse et al.,
2016), gender (Reddy and Knight, 2016) or toxi-
city (Hosseini et al., 2017) classification to cite a
few.
In MT, methods have been proposed to attack
word-based (Zhao et al., 2018; Cheng et al., 2018)
and character-based (Belinkov and Bisk, 2018;
Ebrahimi et al., 2018a) models. However these
works side-step the question of meaning preser-
vation in the source: they mostly focus on tar-
get side evaluation. Finally there is work centered
around meaning-preserving adversarial attacks for
NLP via paraphrase generation (Iyyer et al., 2018)
or rule-based approaches (Jia and Liang, 2017;
Ribeiro et al., 2018; Naik et al., 2018; Alzantot
et al., 2018). However the proposed attacks are
highly engineered and focused on English.
7 Conclusion
This paper highlights the importance of perform-
ing meaning-preserving adversarial perturbations
for NLP models (with a focus on seq2seq). We
proposed a general evaluation framework for ad-
versarial perturbations and compared various au-
tomatic metrics as proxies for human judgment
to instantiate this framework. We then confirmed
that, in the context of MT, “naive” attacks do not
preserve meaning in general, and proposed alter-
natives to remedy this issue. Finally, we have
shown the utility of adversarial training in this
paradigm. We hope that this helps future work in
this area of research to evaluate meaning conser-
vation more consistently.
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A Supplemental Material
A.1 Generating OOV Replacements with
Internal Character Swaps
We use the following snippet to produce an OOV
word from an existing word:
1 def make_oov(
2 word,
3 vocab,
4 max_scrambling,
5 ):
6 """Modify a word to make it OOV
7 (while keeping the meaning)"""
8 # If the word has >3 letters
9 # try scrambling them
10 L = len(word)
11 if L > 3:
12 # For a fixed number of steps
13 for _ in range(max_scrambling):
14 # Swap two adjacent letters
15 # in the middle of the word
16 pos = random.randint(1, L - 3)
17 word = word[:pos]
18 word += word[pos+1] + word[pos]
19 word += word[pos+2:]
20 # If we got an OOV already just
21 # return it
22 if word not in vocab:
23 return word
24 # If nothing worked, or the word is
25 # too short for scrambling, just
26 # repeat the last letter ad nauseam
27 char = word[-1]
28 while word in vocab:
29 word = word + char
30 return word
A.2 IWSLT2016 Dataset
See table 7 for statistics on the size of the
IWSLT2016 corpus used in our experiments.
#train #valid #test
fr-en 220.4k 6,824 2,213
de-en 196.9k 11,825 2,213
cs-en 114.4k 5,716 2,213
Table 7: IWSLT2016 data statistics.
A.3 Breakdown of Correlation with Human
Judgement
We provide a breakdown of the correlation co-
efficients of automatic metrics with human judg-
ment for source-side meaning-preservation, both
in terms of number of perturbed words (Table 8)
and constraint (Table 9). While those coefficients
are computed on a much smaller sample size, and
their differences are not all statistically significant
with p < 0.01, they exhibit the same trend as the
results from Table 3 (BLEU<METEOR< chrF).
# edits BLEU METEOR chrF
1 0.351 0.352 0.486∗
2 0.403 0.424 0.588∗
3 0.334 0.393 0.560∗
Table 8: Correlation of automatic metrics to human
judgment of semantic similarity between original and
adversarial source sentences, broken down by number
of perturbed words. “∗” indicates that the correlation is
significantly better than the next-best one.
Constraint BLEU METEOR chrF
Unconstrained 0.274 0.572 0.599
CharSwap 0.274 0.319 0.383
kNN 0.534 0.584 0.606
Table 9: Correlation of automatic metrics to human
judgment of semantic similarity between original and
adversarial source sentences, broken down by type of
constraint on the perturbation. “∗” indicates that the
correlation is significantly better than the next-best one.
In particular Table 8 shows that the good correla-
tion of chrF with human judgment is not only due
to the ability to distinguish between different num-
ber of edits.
